Devens v. Goldberg by Traynor, Roger J.
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository




Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, Devens v. Goldberg 33 Cal.2d 173 (1948).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/278
(S. F. No. 17735. In Bank. Dec. 7, 1948.] 
KATHERINE DEVENS, Appellant, v. JOSEPH 
GOLDBERG, Respondent. 
[1] Workmen'. Oompensation-Actions Against Uninsured Em-
ploy-ers.-In the case of a personal injury action provided· by 
Lab. Code, §§ 3706-3709, for an employee covered hy the 
Workmen's Compensation Act whose employer fails to secure 
the payment of compensation, the negligence of the employer 
is presuDl('d and the employer may not defend on the ground 
that the employee was contributorily negligent or a!o:sulIlcd 
the hazards attending employment or that he WIl.S injured 
through the negligence of a fellow servant, whcl'!'8s in the 
esse of 1\ personal injury action under Lab. Code, §~ ~SOO-~tS01, 
by an employee not coveTed by the act, the burden of proof of 
negligl'nce ill on the employee and the employer may, in certain 
circulll~tunces, rely on contributory negligence to bllr recovery 
or djmini~h the amount of damages to be awarded. 
[2] Id.-ActioD:! Arainst. Uninsured Employera-Pleading.-While 
there are differences between an action brought under Lab. 
Code, §~ 3706-3709, and one brought under §~ 2800-2801, both 
are bascd on the obligation of the employer to exercise due 
care with regard to the safety of his employees, tht> sllme 
facts relating to negligence will support a recovery in clLch, 
and a complaint which sufficiently alleges the facts relating 
[1] See 26 Oal.Jur. 263. \ 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Workmen's Compensation, § 14; 
[2] Workmen's Compensation, § 15; [3] Master and Servllnt, g 199; 
[4] Judgments, § 113(1); [5J Master and Servant, § 77; [6] Master 
and Servant, § 60; [7] Master and Servant, § 171(3); [8, 10, 12] 
Master and Servant, § 160; [9] Master and Servant, § 105(2); 
[11] Evidence, § 1~; [13] Witneoses, § 285; [14] Master and 
Servant, § 178. 
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10 nf'g1igl'n~f' milS bl'!llrhl'lrl OR 8 (,Olllplllint llndrr ~~ :!ROO,~801. 
although it. ('nntninll n1Jf'~ntir)nR as In ril'fendant's dntir!! nndf!T 
the act. . 
[3] Master and Servant-Injuries to Employee~Appeal-Hana­
less Error.-In a domcstic servant's action for personal in-
juries, the defendant employer was not misled or prejudiced by 
the allegations of the complaint referripg to his duties under 
the Workmen's Compensation Act, where the action was tried 
as one under Lab. Code, §§ 2800-2801, against an employer 
not subject to the act, and where, moreover, the theory of 
the trial was indicated to the employer by the denial of hia 
motion for nonsuit. 
[4] Judgments-Judgment Non Obstante Veredicto-Exercise of 
Power.-A motion for judgment notwithstanding a verdict 
may properly be granted only when, disregarding conHictintt 
evidence and indulging in every legitimate inference wbi"h 
may be drawn from plaintiff's evidencE', the result is a dlltl'r· 
mination that there is no evidence sufficiently substantial to 
support the verdict. 
[5] Master and Servant-Injuries to Employ'ee~Duty a8 to 
Places of Work.-An employer is under a duty to furnish a 
safe working place for his employees. 
[6] Id.-Injuries to Employee~Duty of Inspection.-The employ. 
er's duty to furnish a safe working place for his employt't'l 
requires him to exercise ordinary care and to make reasonably 
careful inspection at reasonable intervals to learn of dangers 
not apparent to the eye. 
[7] Id.---Injuries to Employe~Questions of Fact.-In a domE'stic 
servant's action against her employer for injuries sustained 
when a porch railing gave way, it was for thc jury to deter-
mine whether a dcfective condition existed, whether a reason-
able inspection would have revealed the defect, and what 
constitllted a reasonably adequate inspection in all the cir-
eumstanees. I 
[8] Id.-Injuries to Employee~Evidence.-In a domestic serv-
ant's action against her employer for injuries sustaint'd when 
a porch railing gave way, the evidence supported an implied 
finding of the jury that the railing was defective and that a 
reasonable inspection would have disclosed the defect. 
[9] Id.-Injuries to Employees - Contributory Negligence. - A 
domestic servant is under no duty to make an inspection of 
her employer's premises to discover d(>f('cts, auri she has a 
right to rely on the employer's means of knowledge and hia 
duty of inquiry. 
[5] See 16 Cal.Jur. 995; 35 Am.Jur. 569. 
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[lOa, lOb] Id.-Injuries to Employees-Evidence.-In a domestio 
servant's action ngainst her employer for injuries !\'.lstained 
wh('n a porch rniling gave way, th(' .lefect in the railing was 
itself !lume cvhknce of a failure in the duty to inspect; and 
it ('(mId not 1)(' said as a luatter of law that the use which 
defendant said It(' made of the railing constituted an adequate 
inspection in the discharge of his duty as an employer, since 
tJlC character and extent of the inspection required depend on 
the danger anticipated and other factors. 
[11] Evidence-Judicial Notice.-It is a matter of common knowl-
edge that all wooden structures are likely to get out of repair 
and thnt the exercise of care is necessary to guard against 
the wear and tear of usc and time. 
[12] Master and Servant-Injuries to Employees-Evidence.-In 
a domestic servant's nction ngain!lt her employer for injuries 
sustnined when IL porch railing gave WILY, the jury was not 
required to U('copt defendant's testimony as to the nature and 
extent of his nse of the railing. 
[13] Witnesses-Determination of Oredibility-Motives and In-
terest.-In passing on the credibility of a witness and the 
weight to be given his testimony, the trier of fact can consider 
his interest in the result of the CAse, the manner in which h. 
testified, and the contradictions appearing in the evidence. 
[14] Master and Servant-Injuries to Employees-Questions of 
Fact-Proximate Oause of Injury.-In a domestic servHnt's 
,"ction against her employer for injuries sustained when a 
porch railing gave way, although there was no direct evidence 
on the subject, it was a question for the jury whether the 
defective condition of the railing was the proximate cause of 
the injury, since causation may be proved by circumstantial 
evidence. 
, I 
!, APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San 
, Mateo County. Edmund Scott, Judgc. Reversed with direc-
tions. 
~":' Action by domestic servant against employer for damages 
~.; for personal injuries. Judgment for cit·f(,nchmt notwithstand-
;:, ing verdict for plaintiff, reversed with directions. 
~:. Melvin M. Belli, Henry G. Sanford, Van H. Pinney and Lou 
.~'. Ashe for Appellant. 
"~ George C. Faulkner, R. Edward Burton and Wilkie C. 
i,- Courter for Respondent. 
;:!. GIBSON, C. J.-Plaintiff' hro1Jght this aetion for personal 
i"1t_"-' 
llD.iurw, ",,"'inod iu tho ,"o,w 01 ber duti", wbll. " .. pluyed 
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by tkfellullnt ill his home as a part-time cleaning woman. There 
werl~ nn eyewitncsses to the acridl'nt, aud plaintiff, suffering 
frl)l!! retrograde amnesia, was unable to rClllembcr anything 
about it.'! actual occurrence. She recalled that she went into 
the bathroom of defendant's home to get a rug, which she 
intended to shake over the wooden guard railing on the back 
porch of the house, but remembered nothing further until she 
rl~gained consciousness in a hospital. She was found injured 
and unconscious on the ground below the porch, and near by 
were the rug and part of the railing which had broken loose 
from its pORition. She has appealed from a judgment ren-
d,ered for defendant notwithstanding a verdict in her favor. 
The fiJ'l:lt ground of the motion for judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict was that the only cause of action stated by 
the complaint was one under sections 3706-3709 of the Labor 
Code and that it was barred by a complete defense pleaded 
in dcftmdant's amended answer. The complaint alleged that 
defendant was negligcnt. that the Industrial Accident Com-
mission had found that plaintiff employee and defendant 
employer were subject to the Workmen's Compensation Act, 
and that defendant had wilfully failed to insure. After this 
action was filed, the order of the commission was annulled in 
Goldberg v. Pacific Emp. In.fI. Co., 70 Cal.App.2d 472 [161 
P.2d 272], which held that neither the employee nor the em-
ployer was subject to the act. These facts were pleaded in the 
amended answer. Plaintiff did not amend her complaint, and 
the trial proceeded apparently on the theory that defendant 
WI:lS liable under sections 2800-2801 of the Labor Code in that 
he ncgligently failed to maintain a safe place for her to work. 
[1] By sections 3706-3709 of the Labor Code. the Legisla-
ture has provided a remedy for personal injuries for an em-
ployee covered by the act whose employer fails to secure the 
pa.yment of compensation. The injured employee may sue 
the employer for damages, and in such an action the negligence 
of the employer is presumed. The employer may not defend 
on the ground that the employee was contributorily negligent 
or assumed the hazards attending employment or that he was 
injured through the negligence of a fellow servant. The plain-
tiff may attach the property of the employer, and the action, 
, being maintainable against "the legal representative of any 
deeea.r.ed employer," does not abate with the employer's 
death. (Rideaux v. Torgrimson, 12 Cal.2d 633 [86 P.2d 826].) 
An employee not covered by the act may bring an action for 
dama~c.'i under sections 2800-2801 of the I.Jabor Code. in which 
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action the burden of proof of negligence is on the employt'e, 
and the employer may, in certain circumstances, rely on con-
tributorynegligence to bar recovery or diminish the amount 
of damages to be awarded. The action abates upon the death 
of the employer. (Rideaux v. Torgrimson, 39 Cal.App.2d 273 
[102 P.2d 1104].) 
[2] While there are differences between an action brought 
under sections 3706-3709 and one brought under seetions 2800-
2801, both are based upon the obligation of the employer to 
exercise due care with regard to the safety of his employees. 
The same facts relating to negligence will support a recovery 
in each, and the parties and their relationship are identical. 
Although the remedies are somewhat different, the obligation 
sought to be enforced is the same. If the allegations referring 
to defendant's duties under the act are disregarded, the com-
plaint states facts sufficient to support a recovery for negli-
gence against the defendant employer, and the question is 
whether the form of the pleading misled defendant to his 
prejudice in presenting his defense. (See Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 469.) 
[3] It does not appear that defendant was so mislf"l or 
prejudiced. The instructions indicate that the case was not 
tried on the theory that defendant was liable under sections 
3706-3709, but that it was tried as an action under sections 
2800-2801 against an employer not subject to the act. Plain-
tiff was not given the benefit of the statutory presumption 
of negligence which would have been applicable if the action 
had been tried under sections 3706-3709, and the jury was 
given an instruction on the law of contributory negligence 
which was proper only if the action was within sections 2800-
2801. Moreover, the question whether the complaint stated 
only a cause of action within sections 3706-3709 was raised 
by defendant upon motion for nonsv.it, and the denial of the 
motion was an indication to him that the trial was proceeding 
upon the theory that he was liable as an employer not subject 
to the act. 
[4] The second ground of defendant's motion for judg. 
ment notwithstanding the verdict was that plaintiff faiIe(i' 
to prove any negligence in the maintenance of the premise!!, 
Such a motion may properly be granted only when, disregard. 
ing conflicting evidence and indulging in every legitimattl 
inference which may be drawn from plaintiff's evidence, the 
result is a determination that there is no evidence SUft'\(!Vll" 11, 
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substantial to support the verdict. (Heel v. Manning., Inc., 
19Cal.2d 647, 650 [122 P.2d 576].) 
The back porch of defendant's home was approximately 
5 feet above the ground, and there was a single wooden railing 
constructed of 2" x 4" lumber 3 feet above the porch floor. 
Plaintiff was 5 feet tall, weighed 105 pounds. and was not 
subject to spells of fainting or dizziness. For six years she 
hail been iu the habit of shaking the bathroom rug over the 
railin~, anil it is clear from the evidence that this is what 
she was doing when the accident occurrcd. She testified that 
the only time she put her hand on the railing was when she 
went downstairs and that she came in contact with the railing 
about twice a week when she shook the bathroom rug over it. 
She was asked whether the railing seemed to be "firmly fixed 
and solin, and in place," and she replied, .. I thought flO." 
A next door neighbor testified that at the time of the acci· 
dl'nt she heard some moaning coming from the direction of 
nl'ff'lldant's house, and on investi/lating 14ht' found plaintiff 
lying unconscious on the ground below and beyond the edge 
of the porch. The railing, which was lying near her, was 
splintered and broken and appeared to be decayed. Anothl·r 
witness testified that the railing received "hard usage" and 
t.hat persons using the back porch customarily slammed the 
scrt!('n door against the railing. 
Df'fendant testifien that he had used the porch almost daily 
for Fiov('ral years prior to the accident, that he frequently put 
h~s hand on the railing while picking up milk bottles, and 
that he had never noticed that it was loosc. It did not appear, 
however, that he bad ever inspected the railin~ for the pur· 
pose of determining its strength or soundness. The man who 
repaired the porch after the accident testified that thc railing 
had torn loose from the n"lils attaching it to the upright posts 
on the porch and that it was not decayed. The porch and rail· 
ing were subsequently replaced after this a~tion was com· 
menced. All of the old lumber was destroyed and was not 
available for inspection or introduction in evidence at the trial. 
[5] The rule is well established that an employer is undt?r a 
duty to furnish a safe working place for his employces. [6] This 
duty requires the employer to exercise ordinary care and "to 
make a reasonably careful inspection at reasonable intervals 
to learn of dangers not apparent to the eye." (Cordler v. Kef· 
,(d, 161 Cal. 475, 479 [119 P. 658] ; Fogarty v. Southern Pacific 
Co .. 151 Cal. 785, 795 [91 P. 650] ; see Cra.bbe v. Mammoth 
Cltan'l',el O. Min. Co., 168 Cal. 500, 503 [143 P. 714] ; RusseU T. 
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Pacific Can Co., 116 Cal. 527, 531 [48 P. 616] ; A..lexQ,nder v. 
Central L. & M. Co., 104 Cal. 532, 539 [38 P. 410] ; Prosser, 
Torts [1941] p. 507; Rest., Agency, § 503.) "The extent and 
frequency of inspections depend upon the nature of the things 
to be inspected, the danger to be anticipated if inspections are 
not made, ... and all other factors iuvolved in the determina-
tion of the reasonableness of conduct." (Hest., Agency, § 503, 
p. 1180.) The character of the work and the circumstances 
of the particular case are to be considered in determining 
whether the duty has been performed. (Cordler v. KefJel, 161 
Cal. 475, 479 [119 P. 658] ; Fogarty v. Southern Pacific Co., 
151 Cal. 785, 796 [91 P. 650] ; Dyas v. Southern Pacific Co., 
140 Cal. 296, 308 [73 P. 972] ; Alexander v. Central L. ct M. 
Co., 104 Cal. 532, 539 [38 P. 410].) 
The case of Baddeley v. Shea, 114 Cal. 1 [45 P. 990, 55 Am. 
St.Rcp. 56, 33 L.R.A. 747), relied upon by defendant, did 
not involve an employer-employee relationship. The injured 
party in that case was a business visitor, and it has been rec-
o;!uized that "The relation of master and servant has certain 
peculiarities which have given to the servant a somewhat 
dHft'rent dcgree of protection than that which is given to 
other classes of business visitors." (Rest., Torts, § 332, p. 901.) 
What.cver may be the rule with respect to business visitors 
generally, the character and extent of the duty owed by an 
owner of premises to his employee is clearly settled in this 
state by the decisions cited above. Furthermore, although the 
Baddeley case is possibly explainable on its facts, the opinjon 
contains language which is clearly out of line with latcr deci-
sions of this court and the Restatement rule with respect to 
business visitors. (See Johnston v. De La Guerra Properties, 
Inc., 28 Cal.2d 394,400 [170P.2d.5] ; Hatfield v.Levy Broth-
ers, 18 Ca1.2d 798, 806 [117 P.2d 841) ; Mondine v. Sarlin, 
11 Ca1.2d 593, 597 [81 P.2d 9031 ; Rest., Torts, § 343.) 
[7] It was for the jury to determine whether a defective 
eonrlition existed, whether a reasonable inspection would hav~ 
revealed the defect, and what constituted a reasonably ade-
quate inspection in all the circumstances. (See Neale v. Atchi-
son etc.Ry. Co., 178 Cal. 225, 228 [172 P. 1105] ; Fogarty v. 
Southern Pacific Co., 151 Cal. 785, 796 [91 P. 650] ; Goggin v. 
D. M. Osborne & Co., 115 Cal. 437, 440 [47 P. 248] ; Alex-
ander v. Central L. ct M. Co., 104 Cal. 532, 539 [38 P. 410].) 
[8] The evidence clearly supports the implied finding of the 
jury that the railing was defective and that a reasonable inspec-
tion would have disclosed the defect. The fact that plaintiff 
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WAS not aware of the itangerous rondition doe~ not require a 
ronclusion that the defect would not have been rcveal,~d upon 
a reasonable examination by defendant. [9] Plailltiff was 
unuer no duty to make an inspection to discover Ilefects, anu 
she had a right to rely upon her employer's means .. fkuowl-
edge and his duty of inquiry. (See Starr v. Kreuzheryer, 129 
Cal. 123, 129 [61 P. 787, 79 Am.St.Rep. 92] ; Magee v. Northern 
Pac. R. R. Co., 78 Cal. 430, 437 [21 P. 114, 12 Am.St.Rep. 69] ; 
Majors v. Connors, 162 Cal. 131, 135 [121 P. 371J.) 
[lOa] It is urged, however, that since defendant said he 
used the railing and it gave no indication of being unsound. 
the evidence will not support a finding that he was negligent. 
There are two answers to this contention. First, we cannot 
say as a matter of law that the use which defendant testified 
he made of the railing was sufficient to discharge his duty of 
inspection. As we have seen, the character and extent of the 
inspection required depend upon the danger to be antici-
pated and other factors involved. [11] It is a mat.ter of 
common knowledge that all wooden structures are liable to 
get out of· repair and that the exercise of care is n{'('essary 
to guard against the wear and tear of use and time. (Dyas v. 
Southern Pacific Co., 140 Cal. 296. 309 f73 P. 9721 ; Russell 
v. Pacific Can Co., 116 Cal. 527, 531 [48 P. 616].) [lOb] The 
erection of a railing on an elevated porch is a recognition of 
the danger that would be attended by a fall if it gave way. 
Here we have a wooden railing which had been in plllce for 
at least six years and had never been inspected for the pur-
pose of testing its strength and safety. The defect in the 
railing WAR itself some evidence of a failure in the duty to 
mspect (see Rest., Agency, § 503, com. g), and the jury was 
('ntitled to draw reasonable inferences from all the facts and 
circumstances and base a finding of negligence thereon. In 
these circumstances it was for the jury to determine whether 
the use which defendant said he made of the railing' consti-
tuted an adequate inspection in the discharge of his duty as 
an employer. 
[12] The second answer to defendant's contention is that 
the jury was not required to accept his testimony as to the 
nature and extent of his use of the porch railing. [13] In pass-
ing on his credibility and the weight to be given his u'gtimony, 
the trier of fact could consider his interest in the result of 
the case, the manner in which he testified, and the contradic-
tions appearing in the evidence. (See Huth v. Katz. 30 Cal.2d 
605, 609 [184 P.2d 521].) Since the jury's implied finding 
) 
) 
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that defendant was negligent is supported by th~ record, we 
need not discuss the possible application of res ipsa loquitur. 
[14] Defendant also contends that there was no evidence 
to show that the col1apse of the railing caused the injury. 
Causation may be proved by circumstantial evidence, and 
whether the defective condition of the railing was the proxi-
mate cause of the injury was a question for the jury. (See 
Mosley v. Arden Farms Co., 26 Ca1.2d213 [157 P.2d 372, 
158 A.L.R. 872] ; Rae v. California Equipment Co., 12 Cal.2d 
563, 570 [86 P.2d 3521 ; Anderson v. Seropian, 147 Cal. 201, 
216 [81 P. 521].) In the case of Bock v. Hamilton Squar, 
Baptist Ckurck, 219 Cal. 284 [26 P.2d 7], a woman fell when 
a porch railing collapsed. There were no eyewitnesses, and 
the woman was unable to tell what occurred because she was 
rendered unconscious by the fall. In answer to the conten-
tion that the evidence did not establish that the negligence 
of defendant was ihe proximate cause of the accident, it was 
$Ilid at page 288: "From the evidence before the court it 
could be properly inferred that the injured woman leaned 
against the defective railing while in the act of hanging out 
the towel and that said railing gave way, thereby precipitating 
her to the ground below." (See also Robertson v. Weingart, 
91 Cal.App. 715 [267 P. 741].) 
The judgment for defendant is reversed, and the trial 
court is directed to enter judgment for plaintiff in accordancA 
with the verdict. 
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Carter, J., concurred. 
THAYNOU, J.-I dissel1t. 
Tht> l,anse of the accident is unknown. The plaintiff does 
not remember it and . cannot explain it, and there were no 
eyewitnesses. The railing may have given way as plaintifl 
leanea Ill!'ainst it while shaking a tug over it. She may have 
tripper! before reaching the railing or fallen against it after 
coming out the door. Whatever the cause of the accillent, in 
my upinion there is no evidence that defendant knew of a 
d~fect in the railing or would have known of it by the exercise 
of reasonable care. Defendant's duty to plaintiff was to exer· 
cise orllinary care to provide her with a safe place to work 
&1111 perio.1ically to make reasonably careful inspections of the 
premises to ascertain whether they were in a dangerous eon· 
dition. (Crabbe v. Mammotk Channel G. Min. Co., 168 Cal. 
500, 503 [143 P. 714] i Oordler v. Kef/el, 161 Cal. 475, 41& 
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[119 P. 658] ; Uussell v. Pacific Oan 00., 116 Cal. 527. 531 
[48' P. 616] ; Alexander v. Oentral L. & M. 00., 104 Cal. 532. 
539 [38 P. 410] ; Prosser, Torts, 507; Rest., Agency, § 503.) 
The undisputed evidence establishes that defendant performed 
this duty. 
Until the accident the porch and railing were in continuous 
usc for a period of five or six years. Every witness who tes-
tified regarding the condition of the railing before the accident, 
including the plaintiff herself-, declared that the railing 
appeared to ""be firmly fixed and solid. In the light of this 
undisputed evidence, df>fenrlant's daily use of the railing, in 
• Plaintiff testified as follows: "Q. During the several times th"at 
yon wonld go in and out of this house during that time did yon ever 
"toueh that railing' A. Oh yes, no doubt. 
"Q. Did you touch it every day' A. I don't reDl('mher. 
"Q. Did you touch it more than once during the whole time that 
you wure there' A. J went out there to do some things. I can't rf'mem" 
ber. I put my hand on the railing when I went downstairs, that is 
prohably the only time I would touch that railing. I would have to go 
ever to tile rail if I wanted to put my hand on it. 
"Q. Now. you say-what did you use that uaek poreh for-when you 
W('l'(, actually doing your housework' You spoke about this rug, shaking 
a mg. A. That is praetically what I would use it for-shaking my 
dust mop over it. 
"Q. Did you only do that onee during tbe two months that you were 
there' A. No, oh, no. I did that every time I cleaned the bathroom. 
"Q. How often did you elean the bathroom' A. Well, I would say 
I worked there three times a week, two times n week. 
"Q. And you would eome in contaet witb that railing at least two 
times a week' A. Yell. 
" Q. Now, during that time did you ever find anythini wrong with 
that railing' A. No. 
"Q. Did it ever shake with yon' A. No. 
"Q. Djd you sce anything loose about itt A. No. 
"Q. Di. it seem firmly fixed and solid, and in plaee' A. I thought so. 
"Q. How man,. years out of tbat 14 years had the Goldberg! lived 
at this particular house' A. Five, I think. . 
.. Q. Well, about five years I thUik. It might have been su for al\ 
you know, is that correctt A. I am not 'leTT good at rememhering. 
"Q. Well tbat is very close. It is, you SIlY. about five years that 
,.ou remember out of the-- A. (interrupting). Yes. 
H Q. Now, during that whole five years you worked for the Goldbergs, 
did you notf A. Yes. 
"Q. And you went in and out of this door during that five years' 
A. Yes. 
"Q. And you touehed this railing during your work in that five years, 
did you not. A. Yes. 
"Q. You eame into eontaet with it all the time. 
"Mr. Belli I think that has been asked and answered' 
"The witness. Yes. 
"The Court. Overruled. Go ahead. 
" 
"Q. N~w, Mr~. Devi~s, you 'say th~t it w~s ,.ou; euato~ to ab~ke th; 
l'Ug, isthat right' A. Yes. 
" Q. Will YO\1 mow the jury here just what lOU do when you 'hake 
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t Itl' course of which no comlitiollS nppearf'o that woul(t I('ad 
a person of ordinary prudence to sllspect defects, was suf-
ficient to discharg-e his duty of inspection. The scope of a 
reasonable inspection depends on all of the circumstances 
viewed in the light of the reasonably foreseeable risks in· 
volved. (Rest., Torts, § 307, com. b; Rest., Agency, § 503. 
com. c.) Thus regular nse constitutes a sufficient inspection 
when defects would ordinarily become apparent in the course 
of such use. Defects in wooden railings fall in this category. 
for ordinarily there is unsteadiness in the railing that gives 
warning of their existence. The majority opinion, however, 
takes the view that some undisclosed type of inspection might 
have prevented the accident in this ease. Neither visual inspec. 
tion nor daily use that reveals no infirmity is enough. Appa· 
rl'ntIy the ordinary householder is responsible for defects that 
would be revealed only to a trained building inspector. 
Heretofore a householder had no duty to look for latent 
defects, when he had no notice of any facts that .would induce 
a person of ordinary prudence to suspect their existence. Thus, 
it has been held that the duty of a householder to maintain 
a platform at the bottom of his front stairs in a reasonably 
safe condition was discharged as a matter of law when it 
appeared that defendant had no knowledge of any latcnt 
defects and the everyday use of the platform gave no indica-
tion that it had become unsafe. (Baddeley v. Shea, 114 Cal. 
1 [45 P. 990, 55 Am.St.Rep. 56,33 L.R.A. 747).} In speakin:z 
of the defendant's duty to inspect this court said: "It should 
be borne in mind, however, that the ultimate question of law 
to be decided is whether it was the duty of the defenoant, 
under the circumstances proved, to examine his platform for 
the rug' A. Well, I take it-take the rug and shake it like thia 
(indicating) • 
"Q. Where did you go' A. Over the railing . 
•• Q. And will you come up-to assume that this is your railing-will 
;you come up to this railing' A. I would shake it . 
• , Q. That is a little bit high. Come up to this railing down here 
where it would about hit on you and show us what you do. A. I shake 
it like this, shake a rug like that (indicating). 
"Q. Just wiggle it a couple of timed 
"A. Why I can't shake it vert hard right in front of the lady. Yee. 
I would shake it vert hard if I would shake it out. 
"Q. You would really shake it hard' A. Yes. 
• • Q. You had done the same thing over a course of six years at the 
residence of the Goldbergs, had you' A. Yes. 
" Q. That same thing over this same railing' A. Yes • 
•• Q. And during that time when you were shaking it vigorously as 
;you have outlined did· that railing ever indicate in any way that U 
was either weak or 10088' A. No." . 
) 
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the purpose of ascertaining whether there were latent defectli 
in it; for, if such was not his duty, bis omission to make 
such examination was not negligence in any degree, and the 
defendant was entitled to a verdict (Smith v. Whittier, 95 
Cal. 279 [30 P. 529]) ; and whether or not such was his duty 
depends entirely upon whether or not he had notice of facts 
which would induce a man of ordinary prudence to suspect 
the existence of a latent defect in consequence of which danger 
of injury to person or property might be reasonably appre-
hended; and when, in such a case, the facts, of which one 
charged with negligence had notice, are known and undis-
puted, the question of duty to examine for latent defects is a 
pure question of law, though it may involve a question as to 
the degree of care required, which is also a question of law 
when the facts are given." (Baddeley v. Shea, supra, 114 
Cal. 1, 7.) The scope of a reasonable inspection by a house-
holder thus depends on what conditions if any are apparent 
that would lead a reasonably prudent person to suspect the 
existence of latent defects. In this case not only did defendant 
not know of any facts that might lead him to suspect the 
existence of such a defect, but the solidity of the railing dur-
ing his continuous use and the regular use by others was a 
constant assurance to him that it was in a sound condition. 
None of the cases cited in the majority opinion suggests 
that the duty to inspect goes beyond what defendant did here. 
In Orabbe v. Mammoth Ohannel O. Min. 00., 168 Cal. 500 
[143 P. 714], and Alexander v. Oentral L. ~ M. 00., 104 Cal. 
532 [38 P. 410], the defendants' failure to inspect was not 
in issue: the defendants were ncgligent in not providing a 
safe place to work at the outset. In the former case decedent 
was killed by a rock falling from the roof of an I1nder~ollnd 
mining st~tion. At the time of the accident the station was 
not completely timbered,althoug~theneces.'1ary timber!! had 
been brought to the station two weeks before the ac('ident. In 
rejecting the defenses of assumption of risk :md contributory 
negligence the court pointed out that it is the duty of the 
employer and not the employee to inspect the premises for 
dangerous conditions. In the latter case plaintiff's injury was 
caused by the slipping of a board on a platform. The bonrd 
rested loosely without nailing or other fastening 8S it had 
for some years before the aceident. The court rejected the 
defense of assumption of risk and again pointed out that the 
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In Cordler v. Keffel, 161 Cal. 475 Ill9 P. 6581, there was 
no evidence of regular use by defendant of a wen-eov~riDg 
over which people might walk, and it was held that the duty 
to inspect was not discharged by one inspection in a period 
of 11 years. 
In RusseU v. Pacific Can Co., 116 Cal. 527 [48 P. 616], 
plaintiff was injured by steam diseharged into an outshle 
toilet. The end of the steampipe consisted of an elbow 1'; 
inches long that defendant claimed extended directly down-
ward. The place was examined after the accident, and the 
elbow of the steampipe extended directly upward. Th~ steam-
pipe had not been· inspected in any way by defendant for a 
period of four years before the accident. 
In Fogarty v. Southern Pacific Co., 151 Cal. 785 [91 P. 
650], plaintiff was injured as a result of a defective brake on 
one of defendant's ears, and an examination made after the 
accident indicated that the brake had not been adjusted for 
some time. In violation of company rules no test of the brake 
had been made immediately before the car was set in motion. 
In Dyaa v. Southern Pacific Co., 140 Cal. 296 [73 P. 972], 
there was evidence that the structural defects causing the 
accident had caused a similar accident five years earlier and 
that no repairs had been made in the interim. 
In Neale v. Atchison etc. By. Co., 178 Cal. 225 {172 P. 
1105], the question of the adequacy of inspection was held 
to be for the jury when plaintiff introducecl evidence that 
locomotives wobbled when passing over the track in question 
and defendant introduced evidence showing recent inspection. 
In Dawson v. Pacific Electric By. Co., 177 Cal. 26~ [170 
P. 603], no inspection was made of the rope sling that broke-
and caused the accident before it waS put in use. 
In Bonconi v. Northwestern Pac. B. B. Co., 35 Ca1.App. 
560 [170 P. 6351, it was held that a mere visual inspection 
of a wooden bar used in propelling a railroad han(lcar was 
not sufficient to discharge the employer's duty after a defect 
had been called to the foreman's attention. 
None of these cases is authority for the proposition that 
the duty to inspect a porch railing is not (lischarlled as a matter 
of law whE'n defendant's everyclay use of the railing indicates 
that at no time Will there any weakness or shakiness therein. 
The undispnted eviclence that defendant dischar~d his 
duty of inspection also precludes invoking the doctrine of 
res ipRa loquitul'. That doctrine applies only if it can be said 
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not that the accident was the res~It of defendant 'fl negli~'; 
genee. (LaPorte v. Houston, ante, p. 167 [199 P.2d G65].k 
"Where no such balancc of probabilities in favor of negligence. 
can be found, res ipsa loquitur docs not apply." (Pr~)Gscrt; 
Torts, 207.) In thc presf"nt case the railing at all times" 
appearcd to be firmly fixed and solid. It is thus as probable 
that it gave way because of some extraordinary force or be~' 
cause of somc latent defect no reasonably prudent perSOll would 
have forescen as that it gave way because defendant was neg-' 
ligent. ' 
In my opinion the principles set forth by this court in 
Baddeley v. Shea, supra, 114 Cal. 1, 5-7, nre controlling here 
and compel an affirmance of the judgment. 
Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
Respondent '8 petition for a rehearing was denied Decem-
ber 30, 1948. Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., voted 
for a rehearing. 
